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Abstract
This paper surveys some economic applications of the decision theoretic framework pioneered
by David Schmeidler to model eﬀects of ambiguity. We have organized the discussion principally
around three themes: ﬁnancial markets, contractual arrangements and game theory. The ﬁrst
section discusses papers that have contributed to a better understanding of ﬁnancial market out-
comes based on ambiguity aversion. The second section focusses on contractual arrangements and
is divided into two sub-sections. The ﬁrst sub-section reports research on optimal risk sharing
arrangements, while in the second sub-section, discusses research on incentive contracts. The
third section concentrates on strategic interaction and reviews several papers that have extended
diﬀerent game theoretic solution concepts to settings with ambiguity averse players. A ﬁnal sec-
tion deals with several contributions which while not dealing with ambiguity per se, are linked
at a formal level, in terms of the pure mathematical structures involved, with Schmeidler’s mod-
els of decision making under ambiguity. These contributions involve issues such as, inequality
measurement, intertemporal decision making and multi-attribute choice.
JEL classiﬁcation number:D 8 1
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
What do ambiguity averse decision makers do when they are not picking balls out of urns—when
they ﬁnd themselves in contexts that are "more realistic" in terms of economic institutions involved?
In this part, the reader is provided with a sample of economic applications of the decision theoretic
framework pioneered by David Schmeidler. Indeed, decision theoretic models are designed, at least in
part, to eventually be used to answer questions about behavior and outcomes in interesting economic
environments. Does it make a diﬀerence for the outcome of a given game, or market interaction or
contractual arrangement if we were to assume that decision makers are ambiguity averse rather than
Bayesian? What kind of insights are gained by introducing ambiguity averse agents in our economic
models? What are the phenomena that can be explained in the "ambiguity aversion paradigm" that
did not have a (convincing) explanation in the expected utility framework? Do equilibrium conditions
(e.g., rational expectations equilibrium or any sort of equilibrium in a game) that place constraints
on agents’ beliefs rule out certain types of beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty? These are but
a few of the questions that the contributions collected in this part of the volume have touched upon.
In this introduction we discuss these contributions along with several other papers which, while not
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1included in the volume, make important related points and therefore play a signiﬁcant role in the
literature.
We have organized the discussion of economic applications principally around three themes: ﬁ-
nancial markets, contractual arrangements and game theory. In all these contexts, it is found that
ambiguity aversion does make a diﬀerence in terms of qualitative predictions of the models and,
furthermore, often provides an explanation of contextual phenomena that is, arguably, more straight-
forward and intuitive than that provided by the expected utility model. The ﬁrst section discusses
papers that have contributed to a better understanding of ﬁnancial market outcomes based on am-
biguity aversion. The second section focusses on contractual arrangements and is divided into two
sub-sections. The ﬁrst sub-section reports research on optimal risk sharing arrangements, while in
the second sub-section, discusses research on incentive contracts. The third section concentrates on
strategic interaction and reviews several papers that have extended diﬀerent game theoretic solution
concepts to settings with ambiguity averse players. A ﬁnal section deals with several contributions
which while not dealing with ambiguity per se, are linked at a formal level, in terms of the pure
mathematical structures involved, with Schmeidler’s models of decision making under ambiguity.
These contributions involve issues such as, inequality measurement, intertemporal decision making
and multi-attribute choice.
2 Financial market outcomes
In pioneering work, Dow and Werlang (1992) applied the Choquet expected utility model of Schmei-
dler (1989) to the portfolio choice and identiﬁed an important implication of Schmeidler’s model.
They showed, in a model with one risky and one riskless asset that there exists a non-degenerate
price interval at which a CEU agent will strictly prefer to take a zero position in the risky asset
(rather than to sell it short or to buy it). This constitutes a striking diﬀerence with an expected
utility decision maker, for whom this price interval is reduced to a point (as known since Arrow
(1965).
The intuition behind this ﬁnding may be grasped in the following example. Consider an asset
that pays oﬀ 1 in state L and 3 in state H and assume that the DM is of the Choquet expected utility
type with capacity ν (L)=0 .3 and ν (H)=0 .4 and linear utility function. The expected payoﬀ (that
is, the Choquet integral computed in a way explained in the introduction of this volume) of buying
a nu n i to ft h er i s k ya s s e t( t h ea c tzb)i sg i v e nb yCEν(zb)=0 .6 × 1+0 .4 × 3=1 .8. On the other
hand, the payoﬀ from going short on an unit of the risky asset (the act zs) is higher at L than at H.
Hence, the relevant minimizing probability when evaluating CEν(zb) is that probability in the core of
(ν) that puts most weight on H. Thus, CEν(zs)=0 .3×(−1)+0.7×(−3) = −2.4. Hence, if the price
of the asset z were to lie in the open interval (1.8,2.4), then the investor would strictly prefer a zero
position to either going short or buying. Unlike in the case of unambiguous beliefs there is no single
price at which to switch from buying to selling. Taking a zero position on the risky asset has the
unique advantage that its evaluation is not aﬀected by ambiguity. The ‘inertia’ zone demonstrated
by Dow and Werlang was a statement about optimal portfolio choice corresponding to exogenously
determined prices, given an initially riskless position.1 It leaves open the issue whether this could
be an equilibrium outcome.
Epstein and Wang (1994) is the ﬁrst paper that looked at an equilibrium model with multiple
prior agents. The main contribution is twofold. First, they provide an extension of Gilboa and
Schmeidler’s multiple prior model to a dynamic (inﬁnite horizon) setting. Gilboa and Schmeidler
model is static and considers only one-shot choice. The extension to a dynamic setting poses the
diﬃcult problem of ensuring dynamic consistency of choices, together with the choice of a revision
rule for beliefs that are not expressed probabilistically. The recursive approach developed in Epstein
1See Mukerji and Tallon (2003) for a derivation of this inertia property from a primitive notion of ambiguity without
relying on a parametric preference model.
2and Wang (1994) (and which was subsequently axiomatized by Epstein and Schneider (2003)) allows
one to bypass these problems and ensures that intertemporal choices are dynamically consistent. The
authors also provide techniques enabling one to ﬁnd optimal solutions of such a problem; techniques
that amount to generalizing Euler equalities and dealing with Euler inequalities.
Second, they develop a model of intertemporal asset pricing à la Lucas (1978). They thus con-
struct a representative agent economy, in which the price of the assets are derived at equilibrium.
One central result shows that asset prices can be indeterminate at equilibrium. Indeterminacy, for
instance, would result when there are factors that inﬂuence the dividend process while leaving the
endowment of the agent unchanged. In that case, we are back to the intuition developed in Dow
and Werlang (1992): there exists a multiplicity of prices supporting the initial endowment. The
economic important consequence of this ﬁnding is that large volatility of asset prices is consistent
with equilibrium. Chen and Epstein (2002) develops the continuous-time counterpart of that in Ep-
stein and Wang (1994). They show that excess returns for a security can be decomposed as a sum
of a risk premium and an ambiguity premium. Epstein and Miao (2003) use this model to provide
an explanation of the home-bias puzzle: when agents perceive domestic assets as non ambiguous
and foreign asset as ambiguous, they will hold "too much" (compared to a model with probabilistic
beliefs) of the latter.
The framework developed in Epstein and Wang (1994) has the feature that the equilibrium is
Pareto optimal and, somewhat less importantly, the equilibrium allocation necessarily entails no-
trade (given the representative agent structure). Mukerji and Tallon (2001) develops a static model
with heterogeneous agents. They show that ambiguity aversion could be the cause of less than full
risk sharing, and, consequently, of an imperfect functioning of ﬁnancial markets. Actually, ambiguity
aversion could lead to the absence of trade on ﬁnancial markets. This could be perceived to be a
direct generalization of Dow and Werlang (1992)’s no-trade price interval result. However, simply
closing Dow and Werlang’s model is not enough to obtain this result, as can be seen in an Edgeworth
box. Hence, some other ingredient has to be inserted. Similar to the crucial ingredient leading to
equilibrium price indeterminacy in Epstein and Wang (1994), what is needed here is the introduction
of a component in asset payoﬀs that is independent of the endowments of the agents. Actually, one
also needs to ensure that some component of an asset payoﬀ is independent of both the endowments
and the payoﬀ of any other asset as well. Mukerji and Tallon (2001) prove that, when the assets
available to trade risk among agents are aﬀected by this kind of idiosyncratic risk, and if agents
perceive this idiosyncratic component as being ambiguous and the ambiguity is high enough, then
ﬁnancial market equilibrium entails no trade at all and is suboptimal. This is to be contrasted
with the situation in which agents do not perceive any ambiguity, in which standard replication and
diversiﬁcation arguments ensure that, eventually, full risk sharing is obtained and the equilibrium is
Pareto optimal. Thus, ambiguity aversion is identiﬁed to cause market breakdown: assets are there
to be traded, but agents, because of aversion towards ambiguity, prefer to hold on to their (sub-
optimal) endowments, rather than bear the ambiguity associated to holding the assets. The absence
of trade is of course an extreme result, which in particular is due to the fact that all the assets are
internal assets. It would in particular be interesting to obtain results concerning the volume of trade,
in particular if outside assets were present as well.
Building on a similar intuition, Mukerji and Tallon (2000) explain why unindexed debt is often
preferred to indexed debt: the indexation potentially introduces some extra-risk in one’s portfolio
(essentially, the risk due to relative price variation of goods that appear in the indexation bundle
but that the asset holder does not consume nor possess in his endowments). This provides further
evidence that risk sharing and market functioning might be altered when ambiguity is perceived in
ﬁnancial markets.
Financial applications of the decision theoretic models developed by David Schmeidler are, of
course, not limited to the ones reported above. There is by now a host of studies that address
issues such as under-diversiﬁcation (Uppal and Wang (2003), cross-sectional properties of asset prices
in presence of uncertainty (Kogan and Wang (2002)), liquidity when the model of the economy
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evaluation of these ideas. Thus more work is needed to precisely assess how (non-probabilistic)
uncertainty can be measured in the data. Some econometric techniques are being developed (see
Henry (2001)) but applications are still rare.
In a series of contributions, L.P. Hansen, T .Sargent and coauthors2 have developed an approach
to understanding a decision maker’s concern about "model uncertainty", which, although not formally
building on Schmeidler’s work, is based upon a similar intuition. The idea goes back to what the
"rational expectations revolution" in macroeconomics wanted to achieve: that the econometrician
modeler and the agents within the model be placed on equal footing concerning the knowledge they
have of the model. This led to the construction of models in which agents have an exact knowledge of
the model, in particular in which they knew the equilibrium price function. However, econometricians
typically acknowledge that their models might be misspeciﬁed. Thus, Hansen and Sargent argue,
these doubts should also be present in the agents’ minds. They hence came to develop a model of
robust decision making, wherein agents have a model in mind but also acknowledge the fact that
this model might be wrong: they therefore want to take decisions that are robust against possible
mis-speciﬁcations. Since a particular model implies a particular probability distribution over the
evolution of the economic system, a consideration for robustness can be understood, in familiar terms
of Schmeidler’s decision theory, as a concern for the uncertainty about what probability distribution
is a true description of the relevant environment. Wang (2003) examines the axiomatic foundation a
related decision model and compares it with the multiple prior model.
The paper Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) included in the volume, belongs to this line of
research and takes an important step in formulating the kind of model mis-speciﬁcations the decision
maker may take into consideration. As the authors emphasize "a main theme of the present paper is
to advocate a workable strategy for actually specifying those [Gilboa-Schmeidler] multiple priors in
applied work". The analysis is based on the assumption that the agents, given that they have access
to a limited amount of data, cannot discriminate among various models of the economy. This makes
them value decision rules that perform well across a set of models. What is of particular interest is
that this cautious behavior will show in the data generated by the model as an uncertainty premium
incorporated in equilibrium security market prices, which goes towards an explanation of the equity
premium puzzle.
3 Optimal contractual arrangements
3.1 Risk sharing
Optimal risk-sharing arrangements have been studied extensively, in contact theory, in general equi-
librium analysis and so on. It is a priori not clear whether the risk-sharing arrangements that were
optimal under risk remain so when one reconsiders their eﬃcacy in the context of non-Bayesian uncer-
tainty. Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000) studies the way economy-wide risk-sharing is aﬀected
when agents behave according to the Choquet expected utility model. They show that the Pareto
optimal allocations of an economy in which all agents are of the von-Neumann and Morgenstern
type are still optimal in the economy in which agents behave according to Choquet expected utility
provided all agents’ beliefs are described by the same convex capacity. Things are however diﬀerent
when agents have diﬀerent beliefs. To understand why, consider the particular case of betting: there
is no aggregate uncertainty and agents have certain endowments. The only reason why they might
be room for Pareto improving trade is if agents have diﬀerent beliefs. This is the situation treated in
Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000). They show that in this case, Pareto optimal alloca-
tions are full insurance allocations (i.e., all agents have a constant across state consumption proﬁle) if
and only if the intersection of the cores of the capacities representing their beliefs is non-empty. This
2See for instance Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2001)
and their forthcoming book Hansen and Sargent (2004)
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p l a c ea ss o o na sa g e n t sh a v ed i ﬀerent beliefs, not matter how "small" this diﬀerence is. Thus, the
fact that people do not bet against one another on many issues could be interpreted not as evidence
that they have the same beliefs but rather that they have vague beliefs about these issues, and that
v a g u e n e s si ss u ﬃciently large to ensure that agents have overlapping beliefs. Rigotti and Shannon
(2002) look at similar issues when agents have "multiple priors with unanimity ranking" à la Bewley
(1986) (see the introduction to this volume).
Mukerji and Tallon (2002) also considers a risk-sharing problem, but in the context of a wage
contract. The paper studies the optimal degree of (price) indexation in a wage contract between an
risk-averse employee and a risk neutral ﬁrm, given the presence of two types of price risk. The two
types of risk are, an aggregate price risk, arising from an economy wide shock (possibly, monetary)
that multiplies prices of all goods by the same factor, and speciﬁc risks, arising from demand/supply
shocks to speciﬁc commodities that aﬀects the price of a single good or a restricted class of goods.
If contracting parties were SEU maximizers, an optimal wage contract will typically involve partial
indexation (i.e., a certain fraction of wages, strictly greater than zero, will be index linked). How-
ever, this paper shows that if agents are ambiguity averse with CEU preferences and if they have
an ambiguous belief about speciﬁc price risks involving goods that are neither in the employee’s
consumption basket nor in the ﬁrm’s production set, then zero indexation coverage is optimal so
long as the variability of inﬂation is anticipated to lie within a certain bound. What is crucial is
the ambiguity of belief about speciﬁc price risks. The intuition for this result again rather simple:
ambiguity averse workers will not want to bear the risk associated to changes in relative prices of
the goods composing the indexation bundle if these changes are diﬃcult to anticipate. Thus, even
though indexation insures them against the risk of inﬂation, if this risk is well apprehended (which
i st h ec a s ei nm o s tc o u n t r i e sw h e r ei n ﬂation is low and not very variable) workers prefer to bear this
(known) risk to the ambiguous risk associated to relative price movements which are less predictable.
3.2 Incentive contracts
Typically, incentive contracts involve arrangements about contingent events. As such, the relevant
trade-oﬀs hinge crucially on the likelihoods of the relevant contingencies. Hence, it is a reasonable
conjecture that the domain of contractual transactions is one area of economics that is signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by agents’ knowledge of the odds. Thus such contractual relations are a natural choice as a
particular focus of the research on the principal economic eﬀects of ambiguity aversion.
Why ﬁrms exist, what productive processes and activities are typically integrated within the
boundaries of a ﬁrm, is largely explicated on the understanding that under certain conditions it is
diﬃcult or impossible to write supply and delivery contracts that are complete in relevant respects.
A contract may be said to be incomplete if the contingent instructions included in the contract do
not exhaust all possible contingencies; for some contingencies arrangements are left to be completed
ex post. Incomplete contracts are, typically, ineﬃcient. It is held, ﬁrms emerge to coordinate related
productive activities through administrative hierarchies if such productive activities may only be
ineﬃciently coordinated using incentives delivered through contracts, as would happen if conditions
are such that the best possible contractual arrangements are incomplete. Mukerji (1998) shows that
uncertainty and an ambiguity averse perception and attitude to this uncertainty is one instance of a
s e to fc o n d i t i o n sw h e r e i nt h eb e s tp o s s i ble contracts may be incomplete and ineﬃcient. The formal
analysis there basically involves a reconsideration of the canonical model of a vertical relationship (i.e.,
a relationship in which one ﬁrm’s output is an input in the other ﬁrm’s production activity) between
two contracting ﬁrms under the assumption that the agents’ common belief about the contingent
events (which aﬀect the gains from trade) is described by a convex capacity rather than a probability.
A complete contract which is appropriate in the sense of being able to deliver enough incentives to the
contracting parties to undertake eﬃcient actions, will require that the payments from the contract be
uneven across contingencies. For instance, the contract would reward a party in those contingencies
5which are more likely if the party takes the "right" action. However, the Choquet evaluation of
such contract, for either party, may be low because the expected value of the contracted payoﬀs
vary signiﬁcantly across the diﬀerent probabilities in the core of the convex capacity. Thus a null
contract, an extreme example of an incomplete contract, may well be preferred to the contract which
delivers "more appropriate" incentives. This would be so because the null contract would imply that
the ex post surplus is divided by an uncontingent rule and, as such, deliver payoﬀs that are more
even across contingencies thereby ensuring that the expected value is more robust to variation in
probabilities. Hence, the best contractual agreement under ambiguity might not be a good one, in
the sense of being unable deliver appropriate incentives, and therefore may be improved upon by
vertical integration which delivers incentives by a hierarchical authority structure.
Why might an explanation like the one given above be of interest? A recurrent claim among
business people is that they integrate vertically because of uncertainty in input supply, a point well
supported in empirical studies (see discussion and references in Shelanski and Klein (1999)). The
claim, however, has always caused diﬃculties for economists in the sense that it has been hard to
rationalize on the basis of standard theory (see, for instance, remarks in Carlton (1979)). The analysis
in the present paper explains how the idea of ambiguity aversion provides one precise understanding
of the link between uncertainty and vertical integration.
In a related vein, Mukerji (2002) ﬁnds that ambiguity could provide a theoretical link between
a very prevalent contractual practice in procurement contracting and uncertainty. The prevalent
practice in question is the use of contracts which reimburse costs (wholly or partially) ex post and
therefore provide very weak cost control incentives to the contractor. It is argued in that paper, while
there is ample empirical evidence for this link, for instance in the case of research and development
procurement by the U.S. Defense Department, the existing theoretical underpinnings for this link
based on expected utility are less than plausible. It is worth pointing that the analyzes in both
papers, Mukerji (1998) and Mukerji (2002), model ﬁrms as ambiguity averse entities. Economists
have traditionally preferred to model ﬁrms as risk neutral, citing diversiﬁcation opportunities. Based
on formal laws of large numbers results proved in Marinacci (1999), and following upon the intuition
in Mukerji and Tallon (2001), it may be conjectured that diversiﬁcation opportunities, even in the
limit, are not good enough to neutralize ambiguity, the way they can neutralize risk. The conjecture,
to date, remains an interesting open question.
Intriguingly, the optimal contractual forms characterized in both Mukerji (1998) and Mukerji
(2002) are instances where ambiguity aversion leads to contracts with low powered incentives. It is
an interesting but open question as to how general this is. It has been widely observed that optimal
contracts, say under moral hazard, as predicted on the basis of expected utility analysis are far more
high powered than seen in the real world. It is an intriguing conjecture that high powered, ﬁne tuned
incentive contracts are not robust to the ambiguity about relevant odds and that optimal incentive
schemes under, say, moral hazard would be far less complex when ambiguity considerations are taken
into account than what they are in standard theory. While this question is an important one, ﬁnding
an answer is not likely to be easy. Ghirardato (1994) investigated the principal agent problem under
moral hazard with the player’s preferences given by CEU. A signiﬁcant ﬁnding there is that many of
the standard techniques used in characterizing optimal incentive schemes in standard theory, do not
seemingly work with CEU/MEU preferences. For instance, the Grossman-Hart "trick" of separating
the principal’s objective function into a revenue (from implementing a given action) component and a
cost (of implementing a given action ) component is not possible with CEU/MEU preferences. On a
more positive note, the paper reports interesting ﬁndings about the comparative statics of the optimal
incentive scheme with respect to changes in the agent’s uncertainty aversion. One result shows that
as uncertainty aversion decreases the agent will be willing too implement an arbitrary action for a
uniformly lower incentive scheme. The point of interest is that this is in contrast with what happens
for decreases in risk aversion. Typically, a decrease in risk aversion will have an asymmetric eﬀect
on contingent payments: it will make high payments higher and low payments lower.
64 Strategic interaction
In recent years non-cooperative game theory, the theory of strategic decision making, has come to be
the basic building block of economic theory. Naturally, one of the ﬁrst points of inspiration stimulated
by Schmeidler’s ideas was the question of incorporating these ideas into non-cooperative game theory.
The general research question was, "What if players in a game were allowed to have beliefs and
preferences as in the CEU/MEU model?" More particularly, there were at least three interrelated
sets of questions: (1) a set of purely modeling/conceptual questions: e.g. how should solution
concepts, such as strategic equilibrium, be deﬁned given the new decision theoretic foundations; (2)
questions about the general behavioral implications of the new solution concepts; (3) questions about
insights such innovations might bring to applied contexts. The research so far has largely focussed on
clarifying conceptual questions like deﬁning the appropriate analogue of solution concepts like Nash
equilibrium, and that too almost exclusively in the domain of strategic form games with complete
information. Questions about the appropriate equilibrium concepts in incomplete information games
and reﬁnements of equilibrium in extensive form games remain largely unanswered. However, the
progress on conceptual clariﬁcation has provided signiﬁcant clues about behavioral implications and,
in turn, has led to some important insights in some applied contexts.
One reason why the progress has been largely limited to complete information normal form games,
is the host of supplementary questions that one has to face up to in order to tackle the question of
deﬁning equilibrium even in this simplest of strategic contexts. Deﬁning a strategic equilibrium under
ambiguity involves making several non-trivial modeling choices - namely, whether to use multiple
priors or capacities to represent beliefs and if the latter what speciﬁc class of capacities, whether to
allow for a strict preference for randomization, whether to ﬁx actions explicitly in the description of
the equilibrium, or whether, instead of explicitly describing actions, to simply describe the supports
of the beliefs, and if the latter, what among the various possible notions of support to adopt (see
Ryan (1999) for a perspective on this choice). Unsurprisingly, the deﬁnition of equilibrium varies
across the literature, each deﬁnition involving a particular set of modeling choices.
Lo (1996) considers the question of an appropriate notion of strategic equilibrium, for normal
form games, when players’ preferences conform to the multiple priors MEU model. In Lo’s con-
ceptualization, equilibrium is a proﬁle of beliefs (about other players’ strategic choice) that satisﬁes
certain conditions. To see the key ideas, consider a 2-player game. The component of the equilibrium
proﬁle that describes player i’s belief, about strategic choice of player j, is a (convex) set of priors
such that all j’s strategies in the support of each prior are best responses for j given j’s belief com-
ponent in the equilibrium proﬁle. (Lo also extends the concept to n-player games requiring players’
beliefs to satisfy stochastic independence as deﬁned in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).) This notion
of equilibrium predicts that player i c h o o s e ss o m e( p o s s i b l ym i x e d )s t r a t e g yt h a ti si nt h es e to f
priors describing player j’s belief about i’s choice. In terms of behavioral implications, the notion
implies that an outsider who can only observe the actual strategy choices (and not beliefs), will not
be able to distinguish uncertainty averse players from Bayesian players. Intuitively, the reason why
uncertainty aversion has seemingly so limited "bite" in this construction is that players’ belief set is
severely restricted by equilibrium knowledge: every prior in i’s belief set about j’s strategic choice
must be a best response mixed strategy. In other words, given equilibrium knowledge, there are too
few possible priors, too little to be uncertain about, so to speak. Dow and Werlang (1994), Klibanoﬀ
(1996) and Marinacci (2000), all oﬀer equilibrium concepts with uncertainty aversion that diﬀer from
Lo’s in one key way. They do not restrict the equilibrium belief to only those priors which are best
responses (as mixed strategies); other priors are also possible thus enriching the uncertainty, in a
manner of speaking. One principal eﬀect of this is that these notions of equilibria "rationalize" more
strategy proﬁles compared to Lo’s concept, indeed even strategy proﬁles that are not Nash equilibria.
Dow and Werlang (1994) deﬁnes equilibrium in two player normal form games where players’ have
CEU preferences Schmeidler (1989). Equilibrium is simply a pair of capacities, where each capacity
gives a particular player’s belief about the strategic choice made by the other player. Further,
7the support of each capacity is restricted to include only such strategies which are best responses
with respect to the counterpart capacity. Signiﬁcantly, the equilibrium notion only considers pure
strategies. A pure strategy is deemed to be a best response if it maximizes the Choquet expectation
over the set of pure strategies. Much depends on how the support of a capacity is deﬁned. Indeed, the
only restriction on equilibrium behavior is that only those strategies which appear in the set deﬁned
to be the support of the equilibrium beliefs may be played in an equilibrium. Dow and Werlang
(1994) deﬁnes support A of a capacity µi to be a set (a subset of Sj, the set of strategies of player
j, in the present context) such that µi(Ac)=0and µi(Bc) > 0 for all B ⊂ A. The nature of this
deﬁnition may be more readily appreciated if we restrict attention to convex capacities and consider
the set of priors in the core of such a capacity. Signiﬁcantly, the set includes priors that put positive
probability on pure strategies in Ac which may not be best responses. The convex capacity µi is the
lower envelope of the priors in the core of µi; hence, as long as there is one prior in the core which
puts zero probability weight on sj ∈ Ac, µi (sj)=0 . Hence, a player i’s evaluation of a pure strategy
si will take into account the payoﬀ ui (si,s j), sj ∈ Ac, even though sj may not be a best response
for player j,g i v e nj’s equilibrium belief.
Klibanoﬀ (1996) deﬁnes equilibrium in normal form games and like Lo, applies the multiple
priors framework to model players’ preferences. But there are important diﬀerences. Klibanoﬀ deﬁnes
equilibrium as a proﬁle of tuples ({σi},{mi})
n
i=1 where σi is the actual mixed strategy used by player
i and mi is a set of priors of player i denoting his belief about opponents’ strategy choices. The proﬁle
has to satisfy two "consistency" conditions. One, each σi h a st ob ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hmi in the sense
that σi is a best response for i given his belief set mi. Two, the strategy proﬁle σ−i chosen by other
players should be considered possible by player i. The second condition is a consistency condition on
the set mi in the sense that it has to include the actual (possibly mixed) strategy chosen by the other
players. However, it is permitted that mi may contain priors that are not mixed strategies chosen
by other players and indeed strategies that are not best responses. Hence, Klibanoﬀ’s equilibrium
is diﬀerent from Lo’s in that it puts a weaker restriction on equilibrium beliefs, a restriction that is
very similar to that implicit in Dow and Werlang’s’ deﬁnition. But Klibanoﬀ’s deﬁnition is diﬀerent
from Dow and Werlang’s in that it explicitly allows players to choose a mixed strategy and allows for
mixed strategies to be strictly preferred to pure strategies. Moreover, it is diﬀerent from both Lo’s
deﬁnition and Dow and Werlang’s in that it is speciﬁes more than just equilibrium beliefs: as noted,
it explicitly states which strategies will be played in equilibrium.
Marinacci (2000), deﬁnes equilibrium in 2 player normal form games and, like Dow and Werlang,
applies the CEU framework to model players’ preferences. He also deﬁnes an equilibrium in beliefs,
again much like Dow and Werlang, where beliefs are modeled by convex capacities. However, he
employs a slightly diﬀerent notion of support for equilibrium capacities. His deﬁnition of support
A of a capacity µi consists of all elements si ∈ Si such that µi(si) > 0. This puts a weaker
restriction on beliefs than Lo’s deﬁnition, in very much the same spirit as Dow and Werlang’s and
Klibanoﬀ’s deﬁnitions. But the true distinctiveness of Marinacci’s deﬁnition lies elsewhere. His
deﬁnition includes an explicit, exogenous parametric restriction on the ambiguity incorporated in
equilibrium beliefs. Given a capacity µ(·), the ambiguity of belief about an event A, denoted Ψ(A),
is measured by 1− µ(A)−µ(Ac). The measure is intuitive: Ψ(A) is precisely the diﬀerence between
the maximum likelihood put on A by any probability measure in the “core” of the µ(·), and the
minimum likelihood put on A by some other probability measure appearing in the core. Thus Ψ(A) is
indeed a measure of the fuzziness of belief about A. Marinacci views the ambiguity in the description
of the strategic situation as a primitive, and characterizes a 2-player ambiguous game G by the
tuple {Si,u i,Ψi : i =1 ,2}. The addition to the usual menu of strategies and utility functions is the
ambiguity functional, Ψi : Sj → [0,1], restricting the possible beliefs of the player i to have a given
level of ambiguity: a player i’s belief µi :2 Sj → [0,1] must be such that 1−µi (A)−µi (Ac)=ˆ Ψi (A).
In the models of Dow and Werlang, Lo, and Klibanoﬀ, the equilibrium beliefs are freely equilibrating
variables and as such, the level of ambiguity in the beliefs is endogenous. Given the endogeneity, it
is not possible in these models, strictly speaking, to pose the comparative statics question, "What
8happens to the equilibrium if the ambiguity in the way players perceive information of the strategic
environment changes?" In Marinacci’s model, on the other hand, this question is well posed since
beliefs, as equilibrating variables, are not free to the extent they are subject to the ambiguity level
constraint imposed by the parameter Ψ. Hence, the answer to the question (a very natural one in
an applied context) involves a well posed comparative static exercise showing how the equilibrium
changes when Ψ changes.
Following is one way of understanding why notions of equilibrium in Dow and Werlang (1994),
Klibanoﬀ (1996) and Marinacci (2000) allow a "rationalization" of non-Nash strategy proﬁles. For
instance, in a two player game, it is possible to have as equilibrium, (µ∗
1,µ ∗
2), convex capacities
denoting equilibrium beliefs of players 1 and 2, where s∗





is not a best response to
s∗
j =s u p p(µ∗
i). The key to the understanding lies in the fact that the support of µ∗
i, i =1 ,2, is





> 0, but µ∗
i (sj)=0 .
Since the strategy ˆ sj ∈ ˆ Sj is not in the support of µ∗
i it is not required to be a best response to µ∗
j,
but nevertheless the Choquet integral evaluation of s∗
i, with respect to the belief µ∗
i, may attach a
positive weight to the payoﬀ ui (s∗





> 0. Hence, s∗
i can be an equilibrium best
response even though it may not be a best response to a belief that puts probability 1 on s∗
j.I ti sa s
if the player i, when evaluating s∗
i, allows for the possibility that j m a yp l a yas t r a t e g yt h a ti sn o ta
best response.
The discussion in the preceding paragraph suggests that equilibrium, as deﬁn e dD o wa n dW e r -
lang (1994), Klibanoﬀ (1996) and Marinacci (2000) incorporates a ﬂavor of a (standard) Bayesian
equilibrium involving "irrational types". This point has been further investigated in Mukerji and
Shin (2002). That paper concerns the interpretation of equilibrium in non-additive beliefs in two-
player normal form games. It is argued that such equilibria involve beliefs and actions which are
consistent with a lack of common knowledge of the game. The argument rests on representation
results which show that diﬀerent notions of equilibrium in games with non-additive beliefs may be
reinterpreted as standard notions of equilibrium in associated games of incomplete information with
additive (Bayesian) beliefs where common knowledge of the (original) game does not apply. More
precisely, it is shown that any pair of non-additive belief functions (and actions, to the extent these
are explicit in the relevant notion of equilibrium) which constitute an equilibrium in the game with
Knightian uncertainty/ambiguity may be replicated as beliefs and actions of a speciﬁcp a i ro ftypes,
one for each player, in an equilibrium of an orthodox Bayesian game, in which there is a common
prior over the type space. The representation results provide one way of comparing and understand-
ing the various notions of equilibrium for games with non-additive beliefs, such as those in Dow and
Werlang (1994), Klibanoﬀ (1996) and Marinacci (2000).
Greenberg (2000) analyzes an example of an equilibrium in a dynamic game wherein beliefs
about strategic choice oﬀ the equilibrium path of play are modeled using ideas of Knightian uncer-
tainty/ambiguity. The example illustrates both the appropriateness of this modeling innovation and
its potential for generating singular insight in the context of extensive form games. The example
is a game consisting of 3 players. Players 1 and 2 ﬁrst play a "bargaining game" which can end in
agreement or disagreement. Disagreement may arise due to the "intransigeance" of either player.
However, player 3, who comes into play only in the instance of disagreement, does not have perfect
information as to which of players 1 or 2 was responsible for the disagreement; at the point player
3 makes his choice the responsibility for disagreement is private information to players 1 and 2.
Player 3 has two actions, one of which is disliked by player 1 while the other is disliked by player
2, and disliked more than disagreement. However, player 3 is indiﬀerent between his two choices
though he prefers the agreement outcome to either of them. The conditions of Nash equilibrium
require that players have a common probabilistic belief about 3’s choice. The details of payoﬀsa r e
such that any common probability belief would make disagreement more attractive to at least one
of players 1 and 2. Greenberg argues that agreement, even though not a Nash equilibrium, can be
9supported as the unique equilibrium outcome if the ﬁr s tt w op l a y e r s ’ sb e l i e f sa b o u tw h a t3w i l ld o
in the event of disagreement (an oﬀ equilibrium choice) is ambiguous and players are known to be
ambiguity averse. A common set of probabilities describes players 1 and 2’s prediction about 3’s
choice. But given uncertainty aversion, say as in MEU, each of players 1 and 2 evaluates his options
as if his belief is described by the probability that mirrors his most pessimistic prediction. Hence
the two players, given their respective apprehensions, choose to agree, thereby behaving as if they
had two diﬀerent probability beliefs about player 3’s choice. Greenberg further observes, player 3
may actually be able to facilitate this "good" equilibrium by not announcing or precommiting to the
action he would choose if called upon to play following disagreement; the player would strictly prefer
to exercise "the right to remain silent". The silence "creates" ambiguity of belief and given aversion
to this ambiguity, in turn "brings about" the equilibrium. The question of appropriate modeling of
beliefs about oﬀ-equilibrium path choices has been a source of vexation about as long as extensive
form games have been around. It may be argued persuasively that on the equilibrium path of play,
beliefs are pinned down by actual play . The argument is far less persuasive, if at all, for beliefs oﬀ
the equilibrium path of play. Hence, the appropriateness of modeling such beliefs as ambiguous. But
oﬀ equilibrium path beliefs may be crucial for the construction of equilibrium. As has been noted,
the good equilibrium described in Greenberg’s example would not obtain if players 1 and 2 were
required to have a common probabilistic belief about 3’s choice. Of course, this proﬁle would not be
ruled out by a solution concept that allows for "disparate" beliefs oﬀ the path of play, for instance,
self-conﬁrming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine (1993), subjective equilibrium (Kalai and Lehrer
(1994)), extensive form rationalizability (Bernheim (1984), Pearce (1984)). What ambiguity aversion
adds, compared to these solution concepts, is a positive theory as to why the players (1 and 2) would
choose to behave as if they had particular diﬀering probabilistic beliefs even though they are com-
monly informed. While Greenberg does not give a formal deﬁnition of equilibrium for extensive form
games where players may be uncertainty averse, Lo (1999) does. However, Lo does not go far enough
to consider the question of extensive form reﬁnements. Hence, determining reasonable restrictions
on beliefs about oﬀ equilibrium play, while allowing them to be ambiguous, remains an exciting open
question, hopefully to be taken up in future research.
Analysis of behavior in auctions has been a prime area of application of game theory, especially
in recent years. Traditional analysis of auctions assumes the seller’s and each bidder’s belief about
rival bidders’ valuations are represented by probability measures. Lo (1998) makes an interesting
departure from this tradition by proceeding on the assumption that such beliefs are instead described
by sets of multiple priors and players are uncertainty averse (in the sense of MEU). Lo’s analyzes ﬁrst
and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. In a more signiﬁcant ﬁnding,
he shows, under "an interesting" parametric speciﬁcation of beliefs, that the ﬁrst price auction
Pareto dominates the second price auction. A rough intuition for the result is as follows. Suppose
the seller and the bidders are commonly informed about "others’" valuation, i.e., the information
is described by the same set of probabilistic priors. When the seller is considering which of the
two auction formats to adopt, the ﬁrst or the second price sealed bid auction, he evaluates his
options using that probabilistic prior (from the "common" set of priors) which reﬂects his worst
fears, namely, that bidders have low valuations. Recall that bidders always bid their true valuation
in the second price auction. Therefore, the usual Revenue Equivalence Theorem implies that the
seller would be indiﬀerent between the two auction formats, if bidders’ strategy (in the ﬁrst price
auction) were based on the same probabilistic prior that the seller eﬀectively applies for his own
strategy evaluations. However, given uncertainty aversion, bidders will behave as if the probability
relevant for their purposes is the one that reﬂects their apprehensions: the fear that their rivals have
high valuation. Which means under uncertainty aversion the optimal bid will be higher. On the
other hand, because of his apprehensions, t h es e l l e rw i l lc h o o s ear e s e r v ep r i c ef o rﬁrst price auction
that is strictly lower than the one he chooses for the second price auction. Hence, the ﬁrst price
auction format is Pareto preferred to the second price format. Ozdenoren (2002) generalizes Lo’s
results by relaxing the parametric restriction on beliefs signiﬁcantly. These successful investigations of
10behavior in auctions point to the potential for further research to understand behavioral implications
of uncertainty aversion in incomplete information environments, in general, and of implementation
theory in particular. In general, strategic interaction in incomplete information environments would
appear to be particularly appropriate a setting for investigation since the scope of play of ambiguity is
far greater than what is possible under equilibrium restrictions in complete information settings. More
particularly, Bayesian implementation theory has frequently been criticized for prescribing schemes
which are "too ﬁnely tuned" to the principal’s and agents’ knowledge of the precise prior/posteriors.
Perhaps introducing the eﬀect of uncertainty aversion will lead to the rationalization of schemes
which are more robust in this respect (and hopefully, an understanding of implementation schemes
which are more implementable in the real world!).
Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) apply Dow and Werlang’s notion of equilibrium to analyze the eﬀect
of ambiguity aversion on a public good contribution game. They show that it is possible to sustain
as equilibrium (under ambiguity) a strategy proﬁle which involves higher contributions than possible
under standard beliefs. The rough idea is as follows. Recall our discussion about how the Dow and
Werlang notion may allow a non-Nash proﬁle to be the support of equilibrium beliefs. Working with
the CEU model, Eichberger and Kelsey construct a equilibrium belief proﬁle, wherein each player
i behaves as if there is a chance that another player j plays a strategy lying outside the support
of i’s equilibrium belief, in particular, a strategy that is "bad" for i, i.e., make contribution lower
than the equilibrium contribution. Essentially, it is this "fear" of lower contribution by others, given
the strategic uncertainty, which drives up i’s equilibrium contribution. The paper also extends the
analysis from the public good provision games to consider more general games classiﬁed in terms of
strategic substitutability and complementarity.
Ghirardato and Katz (2002) apply the MEU framework to the analysis of voting behavior to give
an explanation of the phenomenon of selective abstention. Consider a multiple oﬃce election, i.e., an
election in which the same ballot form asks for the voter’s opinion on multiple electoral races. It is
typically observed in such elections that voters choose to vote on the more high proﬁle races (say, the
state governor), but simultaneously abstain from expressing an opinion on other races (say, the county
sheriﬀ). Ghirardato and Katz’s objective is to formalize a commonly held intuition that the reason
the voters selectively abstain is because they believe that they are relatively poorly informed about
the candidates involved in the low proﬁle races. The paper contends that the key to the intuition
is the issue of modeling the sensitivity of a decision maker’s choice to what he perceives to be the
quality of his information and that this issue cannot be adequately addressed in a standard Bayesian
framework. On the other hand, they argue, it can be addressed in a decision theoretic framework
which incorporates ideas of ambiguity; roughly put, information about an issue is comparatively
more ambiguous and of lower quality if the information about the issue is represented by a more
encompassing set of priors. This point would seem to be of wider interest and worth pursuing in
future research.
5 Other applications
Finally, we survey some applications of the tools developed by David Schmeidler that do not, per se,
involve decision making under uncertainty. The applications covered relate to the measurement of
inequality, intertemporal choice and multi-attribute choice.
Inequality measurement
Decision theory under risk and the theory of inequality measurement essentially deal with the
same mathematical objects (probability distributions). Therefore, these two ﬁelds are closely related,
and their relationship has long been acknowledged.3 However, surprisingly enough, almost all the
3For instance, it is easy to check that the well-known Gini index relies on a Choquet integral (with respect to
a symmetric capacity). Indeed, as recalled in the introduction to this volume, the ﬁrst axiomatization of a rank
dependent model was provided in the framework of inequality measurement (Weymark (1981)). We will not expand on
11literature on inequality measurement deals with certain incomes. This is probably due, in part, to a
widely held opinion that the problem of measuring inequality of uncertain incomes can be reduced to a
problem of individual choice under uncertainty (say, e.g., by ﬁrst computing in each state a traditional
welfare function àl aAtkinson-Kolm-Sen, and then reducing the problem to a single decision maker’s
choice among prospects of welfare) or alternatively to a problem of inequality measurement over sure
incomes (say, e.g., by evaluating each individual’s welfare by his expected utility, and then considering
the distribution of the certainty equivalent incomes). In a path-breaking paper, Ben Porath, Gilboa,
and Schmeidler (1997) show that such is not the case, and that inequality and uncertainty should be
analyzed jointly and not separately in two stages. They present the following example which serves
to illustrate their point . Consider a society with two individuals, a and b, facing two equally likely
possible states of the world, s and t, and assume that the planner has to choose among the three










Observe that in P1, both individuals face the same income prospects as in P2; but in P1, there is no ex
post inequality, whatever the state of the world. This could lead one to prefer P1 over P2. Similarly,
P2 and P3 are ex post equivalent, since in both cases, whatever the state of the world, the ﬁnal
income distribution is identical; but P3 gives 1 for sure to one individual, and 0 to the other, while P2
provides both individuals with the same ex ante income prospects. On these grounds, it is reasonable
to think that P2 should be ranked above P3. Thus, a natural ordering would be P1 Â P2 Â P3.
Ben Porath et al., point out that there is no hope to obtain such an ordering by two-stage
procedures. Indeed, the ﬁrst two-stage procedure (mentioned earlier) would lead us to neglect ex
ante considerations and to judge P2 and P3 as equivalent. In contrast, the second procedure would
lead us to neglect ex post considerations and to see P1 and P2 as equivalent. In other words,
these procedures would fail to simultaneously take into account the ex ante and the ex post income
distributions.
They suggest solving this problem by considering a linear combination of the two procedures,
i.e., a linear combination of the expected Gini index and the Gini index of expected income. This
solution captures both ex ante and ex post inequalities. Furthermore, it is a natural generalization
of the principles commonly used for evaluating inequality under certainty on the one hand, and for
decision making under uncertainty on the other hand.
The procedure suggested in Ben Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997) is not the only possible
evaluation principle that takes into account both ex ante and ex post inequalities. Any functional
that is increasing in both individuals’ expected income and snapshot inequalities (say, measured by
the Gini index) has the same nice property, provided that it takes its values between the expected
Gini and the Gini of the expectation. Furthermore, it is unclear why we should restrict ourselves, as
Ben Porath et. al did, to decision makers who behave in accordance with the multiple priors model.
Finally, they do not provide an axiomatization for the speciﬁc functional forms they propose. This
problem is partially dealt with in Gajdos and Maurin (2002), who provide an axiomatization for a
broad class of functionals that can accommodate Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s example.
Intertemporal choice and Multi-attribute choice
Schmeidler’s models on decision under uncertainty have also been shown to hold new insights
when applied to decision making contexts and questions that do not (necessarily) involve uncertainty.
For instance, in the context of intertemporal decision making (under certainty). In terms of abstract
construction, a intertemporal decision setting is essentially the same as that of decision making under
uncertainty with time periods replacing states of nature. Gilboa (1989) transposes the Choquet
expected utility model of decision under uncertainty to intertemporal choices. He shows that using
this literature, which has very close links with the RDEU model, here.
12the axiomatization of Schmeidler (1989) and adding an axiom called “Variation preserving sure-
thing principle" the decision rule is given by a weighted average of the utility in each period and
the utility variation between each two consecutive periods. Aversion towards uncertainty is now
replaced by aversion towards variation over time of the consumption proﬁle. Wakai (2001) in a similar
vein uses the idea that agents dislike time-variability of consumption and axiomatizes a notion of
non-separability in the decision criterion. He then goes on to show how such a decision criterion
modiﬁes consumption smoothing and can help providing an explanation to the equity and the risk-
free rate puzzle. Marinacci (1998) also uses a transposition of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) model
to intertemporal choice and axiomatizes a complete patience criterion with a new choice criterion
(the Polya index). De Waegenaere and Wakker (2001) generalizes the Choquet integral to signed
Choquet integral, which captures both violations of separability and monotonicity. This tool can
be used to model agents whose aversion towards volatility of their consumption is so high that they
could prefer a uniformly smaller proﬁle of consumption if it entails suﬃciently less volatility. A
work of related interest is Shalev (1997), which uses a mathematically similar technique to represent
preferences incorporating a notion of loss aversion in an explicitly intertemporal setting, i.e., where
objects of choice are intertemporal income/consumption streams and the decision maker is averse to
consumption decreasing between successive periods.
In the context of decision making under uncertainty, the Choquet integral may be viewed as a way
of aggregating utility across diﬀerent states in order to arrive at an (ex ante) decision criterion. Multi-
attribute choice concerns the question of aggregating over diﬀerent attributes, or characteristics, of
commodities in order to formulate an appropriate decision criterion for choosing among the multi-
attributed objects (see for instance Grabisch (1996), Dubois, Grabisch, Modave, and Prade (2000).)
The use of variants of the Choquet integral allows some ﬂe x i b i l i t yi nt h ew a ya t t r i b u t e sa r ew e i g h t e d
and combined. In an interesting paper, Nehring and Puppe (2002) use the multi-attribute approach
to modeling (bio-)diversity. In doing so, they develop tools to measure diversity, based on the notion
of the (Möbius) inverse of a capacity. Interestingly, this is also related to another line of research
developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler, namely Case-Based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1995), Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001))
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This was a review of a sample of the rich, varied, and very much "alive" literature that has been
inspired by David Schmeidler’s path breaking contributions to decision theory. We do want to em-
phasize that it is very much a sample; the list of papers discussed or cited is far from exhaustive.
Nevertheless, we hope the following conclusions are justiﬁable even on the basis of the limited dis-
cussion. First, that thinking of decision making under uncertainty in the way Schmeidler’s models
prompt and allow us to do, incorporating issues such as sensitivity of decision makers to the ambi-
guity of information, does lead to new and important insights about economic phenomena. Second,
that while it has long been suspected that issues like ambiguity could be of signiﬁcance in economics,
the great merit of Schmeidler’s contribution has been to provide us with tools that have allowed us
to develop tractable models to investigate these intuitions in formal exercises, per standard practice
in economic theory. The opportunity we have had is quite unique. There are several other branches
of decision theory that depart from the stand expected utility paradigm. But comparatively, these
branches have seen far less applied work. One cannot help but speculate that the relative suc-
cess of the ambiguity paradigm is in no small measure due to the tractability of Schmeidler’s models.
Tractability, is a hallmark of a classic model. Lastly, we hope the review has demonstrated that there
are many important and exciting questions that remain unanswered. And indeed, enough progress
has been made with modeling issues which gives us grounds to be optimistic that the answers to the
open questions cannot be far away. Therefore, researchers should consider such questions deﬁnitely
worth investigating.
13While we have mentioned several issues worthy of future investigation in the course of our dis-
cussions, there are couple of issues that we have not touched upon. One, we hope there will be more
directed empirical work, directed to testing predictions and also the basis of some of the assumptions,
for instance in ﬁnancial markets. Two, as would have been evident in our survey, most of the work
has been of the "positive" variety, meant to help us "understand" puzzling phenomena. Perhaps, we
also want to think about more normative questions: for instance, "What is a good way of deciding
between alternatives, in a particular applied context, when information is ambiguous ?" The work of
Hansen, Sargent and their coauthors is one notable exception, but more is needed, perhaps in ﬁelds
like environmental policy making where, arguably, information is in many instances, ambiguous.
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